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Constitutional Redemption & Constitutional Faith
INTRODUCTION
In the first issue of this volume, the Maryland Law Review published a symposium exploring the history, interpretation, and modern
implications of the Thirteenth Amendment. This Amendment unequivocally ended the most abhorrent and inhumane institution in
American history along with its “badges and incidents.” Several articles in that symposium suggested that the language of the Thirteenth Amendment could also eradicate certain contemporary injustices. 1 In this final issue of the volume, the Maryland Law Review
features a symposium building upon that theme by asking whether
social and political injustice that is either furthered or tolerated under the current Constitution can be eradicated by that same Constitution, or if such injustice renders the Constitution an “agreement with
2
hell.”
Professor Jack M. Balkin believes that the Constitution can be redeemed in its current iteration. This is the premise of Professor Balkin’s recent book, and impetus for this symposium, Constitutional Re-

1. Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy of
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83 (2011); Julie Novkov, The
Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds, 71 MD. L. REV. 203 (2011); James
Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV.
189 (2011).
2. See WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD
GARRISON 205 (1963) (quoting William Lloyd Garrison).

953

954

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:953

demption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. 3 There is a qualified hope
in Constitutional Redemption: We redeemed the Constitution in the
4
past, and we can do it again. But what if the Constitution cannot be
redeemed and really is an “agreement with hell?” Professor Sanford
Levinson believes that a constitutional convention needs to be called
for a substantial revision or redrafting of the Constitution. At one
time, Professor Levinson had faith that the Constitution could remedy
the injustices and inequities that it perpetrates and permits. He no
longer shares Professor Balkin’s optimism, as the revised edition of
5
Levinson’s Constitutional Faith makes clear. In his contribution to this
Symposium, Professor Levinson writes, “I believe that the Constitution
6
has saddled us with a fundamentally defective political system.”
The articles in this Symposium were written for a conference celebrating the publication of Balkin’s Constitutional Redemption and the
republication of Levinson’s Constitutional Faith at the University of
Texas School of Law on October 21–22, 2011. While none of the authors unequivocally subscribe to either Balkin’s or Levinson’s viewpoints on the Constitution, all fall somewhere along the spectrum
spanning the hope of constitutional redemption and the dismay of a
failed promise. These articles provide insightful commentary on
modern constitutional theory, political power, and how the American
public interprets the Constitution.
Professor Aziz Rana cautions that adherence to constitutional
continuity can foster injustices just as easily as constitutional rupture,
and that on certain occasions breaking with constitutional continuity
may be more beneficial to progressive causes. 7 Rana suggests that after the Civil War a break with constitutional continuity may have jettisoned remnants of colonialism that persist in the Constitution today. 8
Professor Jamal Greene questions the merit of constitutional continuity by identifying recurring inconsistencies in originalist constitutional
interpretation, notably originalists’ curious neglect of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the intentions of its framers. 9
3. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD (2011).
4. See Jack M. Balkin, The Distribution of Political Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 1144 (2012).
5. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011) (1988); Sanford
Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956 (2012).
6. Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, supra note 5, at 976.
7. Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L. REV.
1015, 1019–20 (2012).
8. Id. at 1020.
9. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980–81
(2012).
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Focusing on democratic social movements, Professors Gerald
Torres and Lani Guinier argue that Balkin’s theory of constitutional
redemption underestimates the importance of the common people
(as opposed to political elites) as sources of constitutional change and
constitutional legitimacy. 10 Torres and Guinier elaborate on their
concept of “demosprudence” in order to illustrate how social movements influence the law and governing institutions, especially in times
of social crisis. 11
Perhaps the most centrist views on constitutional redemption belong to Professor Mark Graber. Graber pragmatically states that some
compromises in the Constitution may lead to less than ideal outcomes, but in the end, those mediocre outcomes may be better than
no compromise at all. 12 For Graber, this tradeoff is acceptable so long
as the compromise does not benefit one group to the exclusion of
another group absent from the bargaining process, something Graber
describes as a “really rotten deal.” 13 The nature of compromises within the Constitution does not trouble Professor H.W. Perry, Jr., who
agrees with much of Balkin’s theory of constitutional redemption, but
is less hopeful that we can achieve it. Perry argues there are more obstacles to change today than ever before, with the public and politicians less willing to challenge the Supreme Court’s authority. 14 Andrew Koppelman, whose contribution to the symposium continues his
tradition of insulting Jack Balkin in the titles of his work, considers
what moral philosophy can teach us about respect for each other’s
conceptions of a common Constitution—if we can agree such a doc15
ument exists at all.
The Maryland Law Review thanks the authors for contributing to
this Symposium. We also thank Professor Jack Balkin and Professor
Sanford Levinson for allowing us to participate in and publish the articles from the conference on Constitutional Redemption and Constitutional Faith.
NATALIE A. WARYCK
10. Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the
People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1064–66 (2012).
11. Id. at 1068.
12. Mark A. Graber, Redeeming and Living with Evil, 71 MD. L. REV. 1073, 1085–89
(2012).
13. Id. at 1081.
14. H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional Redemption, and Political Science:
Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098, 1107–20 (2012).
15. Andrew Koppelman, Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law, or, Is Jack Balkin
Heartbreaking?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1126, 1130–34 (2012).
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